Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 15

Number 3

Article 7

Developing a Structured Analytical Model to Anticipate Social
Movement National Security Threats
Brigit L. Davis
National American University, brigitdavis3@gmail.com

Anthony Wenger
National American University, awenger@national.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss

pp. 112-126
Recommended Citation

Davis, Brigit L. and Wenger, Anthony. "Developing a Structured Analytical
Model to Anticipate Social Movement National Security Threats." Journal of
Strategic Security 15, no. 3 (2022) : 112-126.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.3.2048
Available at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss3/7
This Student Publications is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at
Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For
more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Developing a Structured Analytical Model to Anticipate Social
Movement National Security Threats
Abstract
For most of the 2000s, experts assessed that social movements across the globe were
increasingly engendering most of the threats nation-states faced internally and externally.
These assessments and extensive literature on social movement use of social media
underpinned a doctoral research effort that helped address a noted literature gap in
predicting social movement threats via social media. The research results showed social
movement themes are observable in social media content and, although not fully vetted,
National Security practitioners can use these themes in a structured analytical model to
assess the probability of a threat. This article provides an overview of the research and
model in the dissertation Anticipating Social Movement National Security Threats: Social
Media Content’s Potential in Developing a Structure Analytical Model.
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Introduction
An abundance of research, combined with 20 years in the U.S. Intelligence
Community in various capacities, led the author to assess that the main
threat nation-states would face in the near- and long-term would not be
from traditional nation-state forces. Instead, the threat is more likely to
come from non-state actors such as social movements and social
movement organizations (SMO). The United Nations reached a similar
conclusion in 2020 and stated, “Conflicts now tend to be less deadly and
often waged between domestic groups rather than states.”1
Initial research led the author to assess non-state actors such as the
Iranian Green Movement, Arab Spring, al-Qaida (AQ), and the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are social movements heavily engaged in
posting information on social media.2 Leaders and members of these
groups have historically provided unprecedented insight into mission,
ideology, and tactics, to name a few, through social media: A new and
innovative way to gain global support not previously available to social
movements pre-2000s. The question became whether it would be possible
to use the information these groups are providing on social media to
assess which ones have a higher probability of posing a threat to U.S.
national security. The research effort focused on answering the question
by first establishing how social movements could threaten U.S. national
security, clearly defining the core terms (social movements, SMO, and
national security), and developing and answering three subordinate
questions. See Figure 1. The remaining article provides an overview of the
extensive research conducted from available literature, the data collection
and analysis method, findings, and the conclusions derived from the
study.
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Figure 1. Threats Social Movements Pose, Core Study Definitions, &

Research Questions
Source: Adapted from “Anticipating Social Movement National Security
Threats: Social Media Content’s Potential in Developing a Structured
Analytical Model,” by Brigit Davis, 2021, pp. 2, 6, & 11-14, ProQuest
Dissertations and Theses Global.

Literature Review
A review of a wide array of literature sources using social movementrelated terminology combined with digital activism or social media
produced limited forecasting or prediction studies. However, one study
identified focused on using social media to predict protest events or
collective behavior at a tactical level.3 The main difference between the
identified study and the dissertation research effort was determining the
ability to use social media to assess which social movements might pose a
national security threat at the strategic level versus seeking to predict all
collective behavior.
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Social Movement Theories
The ability to collect data and answer the research questions hinged on the
ability to understand existing research on social movements. The main
areas of social movement research focused on understanding the
phenomena through four specific theoretical lenses: Framing, Grievance
or Relative Deprivation, Resource Mobilization, and Political Process.
Table 1 provides an overview of the main points identified for each theory
derived from existing literature sources.
Table 1. Overview of Main Points for the Four Theoretical Lenses
Theory
Framing

1.

2.

3.

Grievance
or
Relative
Deprivation

1.

2.

3.

Main Points
Erving Goffman is the first sociologist to advance the
framing theory to develop an understanding of how an
individual can interpret an issue from different
perspectives called frames.4 Experts characterized framing
in three ways: Diagnostic (problem), prognostic (solutions
and tactics), and motivational (a call to action).5
Subsequent researchers investigated how social
movements use frames to achieve desired end-states or a
strategic advantage through targeted messaging.6
The more effective messaging is cohesive and incorporates
the three framing elements and cultural themes to develop
in-group identity, the de-humanization of the out-group,
and the invocation of moral outrage of out-group actions.7
Researchers have argued social movements form because
of grievances.8 However, the level of importance varies as
some state researchers state grievances always exist but do
not always generate movements.9
One researcher argued that it is not grievances spurring
social movement development but the absence of
opportunities compared to expectations creating a
situation referred to as relative deprivation.10
Some research indicates that a movement experiencing
violent behavior from an out-group, such as murder,
torture, and rape, is more likely to engage in similar
activities.11 Others point to the action repertoires of other
social movements, out-group reactions, and grievance
longevity as contributors to the choice to engage in violent
action.12
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Theory
Resource
Mobilization

Main Points
1. Social movements require resources and infrastructure to
survive.13 There are five noted categories of resource
support for social movements: Moral, cultural, socialorganizational, human, and material.14
2. SMOs are essential in maintaining a movement’s longevity
and the acquisition, facilitation, and use of resources.15
3. The evolution of technology and communication mediums
has resulted in the use of social media platforms likely to
gain sympathy and support for the cause.16 In several
instances, researchers do not consider these mediums
critical resources as movements were still able to mobilize
with low Internet penetration rates.17
4. Facilitating frames in multiple languages is critical for
influencing targeted audiences outside the movement’s
physical sphere.18 Gaining external support is critical to
achieving legitimacy and acceptance.19
Political
1. McAdam introduced the political process theory by
Process
positing that the environment plays a more significant role
in social movement development and mobilization than
previously assumed.20
2. Research revealed there are four environmental reasons a
movement will start on a trajectory of violence: Nationstate ignores expressed grievances, the nation-state or
agents of the state respond to the movement with violent
action, exposure to violence through repressive regime or
other movements mobilized in the area, low accessibility
to the nation state’s political system.21
3. Social scientists have not yet explored how the online
environment might influence mobilization decisions;
however, social media researchers have delved into related
research. There is evidence that nation-states pay
individuals to post content to worsen fractures in
adversarial societies and that the re-posting of radical
content by concerned citizens can significantly impact
social movement decision-making.22
Source: Adapted from “Anticipating Social Movement National Security
Threats: Social Media Content’s Potential in Developing a Structured Analytical
Model,” by Brigit Davis, 2021, pp. 17-39, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses
Global.
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Methodology
The author completed the qualitative research in three phases to align with
the three research sub-questions. The first phase involved selecting
literature from the literature review and new searches, conducting
thematic coding, and developing a preliminary thematic codebook. The
second phase involved selecting social movement and SMO cases,
collecting social media content, conducting content analysis coding, and
updating the thematic codebook from Phase 1. The last phase involved
using the thematic codebook to explore SATs’ applicability to transition to
thematic codes to indicators and design a structured analytical predictive
model.
Data Collection
The literature selected for coding had to be relevant to the framing,
grievance and relative deprivation, resource mobilization, and political
process theories. These theories were best suited for the research effort
because each supplied a broad overview of social movement characteristics
assessed to have the potential to be observable within social media
content. The author selected thirty-eight of 107 evaluated literature review
sources and an estimated fifty new sources to provide a representative
sampling of the four theories to form a baseline understanding of the
social movement phenomenon.
In selecting the six cases used in the study, the cases had to be active in the
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) countries listed in a U.S. Department
of State publication. Searches occurred within the University of Maryland
Global Terrorism Database, the Terrorism Research and Analysis
Consortium, and open-source Google searches to identify social
movements and SMOs active in nine SOFA countries aligned with
established definitions for those entities. The author assigned
revolutionary, reactionary, and reformative movement labels to each of the
forty-five cases in the selection pool, assigned each a randomized number,
sorted cases, and selected two for each movement type to prevent undue
bias in the results.
The social media content collected for each case occurred on Facebook,
YouTube, Twitter, and articles discussing SMO content on each social
116
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media platform. The collection followed an established seven-day process,
with day one focused on background research and terminology
identification and days two through seven divided equally between the
three social media platforms. The time spent on research and social media
collection depended on the results and ranged from two hours to eight and
a half hours. Out of the six randomly selected cases, the researcher found
articles related to the case’s social media activity, social media content, or
both, except for Revolutionary Case 2.
Coding Process
The coding of the literature and social media data followed a process of
reviewing data, identifying common themes, developing and refining
codes deductively and inductively, and establishing definitions. There were
two rounds of coding for the literature, which consisted of four readthroughs for each round; clear statements and inferences combined with
dictionary sources served as the foundation for the code definitions. The
same process occurred for the collected social media content, with each
case subject to six rounds, one round for each of the six established
primary thematic codes.
Structured Analytic Techniques
The SATs selected for testing rely on indicators developed using identified
codes and associated definitions from phases 1 and 2 and three scenarios
devised in phase 3. The scenarios are a case would
1. Pose a direct threat to U.S. national security
2. Pose a national security threat to a SOFA country, or
3. Not pose a national security threat to the United States or SOFA
country.
Each brainstormed indicator then underwent an analytical assessment to
determine if it was observable and collectible, valid, reliable, stable, and
unique, as defined by Heuer, Pherson, and Pyrik. Validation of the
surviving indicators aligned to each scenario occurred by determining how
likely the indicators were to happen in each scenario. For example, it is
highly unlikely that analysts would observe the United States or a SOFA
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country supporting and responding to the case’s efforts to enact change in
scenarios 1 and 2.
Paired comparison and weighted ranking are the two predictive SAT
options explored using scenario 1: A case that would pose a threat to U.S.
national security. Using these SATs required comparing each indicator to
another to determine which is more critical or diagnostic and assigning a
score from zero to three, resulting in 378 comparisons. The resulting
scores established the percentages for each indicator in the tested
predictive models. The only difference in the weighted ranking option was
the addition of sub-indicators for five of the brainstormed indicators,
which required a calculation of weights or sub-percentages.

Findings and Analysis
Analysis of the collected data occurred in each of the three phases of the
research. In phase 1, a review of selected literature sources produced an
initial set of four primary thematic codes, nine secondary thematic codes,
and forty-seven tertiary thematic codes referred to as keywords and
phrases. In phase 2, twenty-two of the thematic codes derived from the
literature appeared within the social media content. However, some
realignment and adjustments to the coding schema did occur, resulting in
six primary thematic codes, thirty-one secondary thematic codes, and
twenty-three tertiary thematic codes.
Of the six selected cases, the completed searches and collected data
showed that those with a reputation for employing violent contention were
more challenging to find on Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. The absence
of such content on these platforms was not always the case, as research
revealed that YouTube hosted tens of thousands of videos promoting
violent contention at some point in time before employing artificial
intelligence technology to censor and remove such content. Figure 2
provides a graphical representation of the number of social media content
where each code appears. An overview of the general observed themes is as
follows:
•

Cases used language, photographs, and videos to communicate
messaging to evoke emotions and establish commonality within
targeted audiences.
118
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•

Non-revolutionary cases promoted non-violent contention to
bring attention to grievances and encourage change, whereas
the observed revolutionary case promoted violent contention.
However, one non-revolutionary case promoted non-violent
contention and expressed a willingness and acceptance of
violent contention.

Figure 2. Data Results for the Six Primary Thematic Codes

Source: Adapted from “Anticipating Social Movement National Security
Threats: Social Media Content’s Potential in Developing a Structured Analytical
Model,” by Brigit Davis, 2021, pp. 79-80, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses
Global.
Note: Note. EM = Emotion, S/T = Solution/Tactics, P = Problem, ONC = Other
Narrative Components, PPL = People, T = Tools, PR = Public Response, ET =
Environment, and G = Government.

The author expected more social media content related to violent
contention, anger, and moral outrage related to the revolutionary cases.
However, such content appeared limited within Facebook, YouTube, and
Twitter, likely owing to increased efforts to remove such content on these
platforms through artificial intelligence and reporting mechanisms.
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Despite these limitations, there was sufficient data to brainstorm sixtyeight indicators for the three previously outlined scenarios: Twenty-seven
each for scenarios 1 and 2, and eight for scenario 3. Since the application
of the predictive models is limited to scenario 1, Table 2 provides a
sampling of the brainstormed indicators and associated indicator
validation.
Table 2. A Sampling of Scenario 1 Indicator Validation Matrix
I-2

I-4

I-22

I-3

I-7

I-12

Indicator Statements
The case explicitly blames
the United States for the
problem it is trying to rectify.
The case promotes violent
contentious activities to
achieve its stated aims
against the United States.
The case’s foot soldiers share
personal narratives
describing reasons behind
joining the cause, specific
events, or participation in
violent contentious activities.
The case has weapons such
as rifles, handguns, and
ground-to-air missile
launches to engage in violent
contention.
The case competes with
similar entities in the United
States, using violent
contention to achieve its
stated aims.
The case originates in a
politically unstable
environment and uses
language in its social media
content to communicate the
belief that the United States
contributed to or caused the
unstable environment.

S1

S2

S3

Totals

HL

C (2)

HU
(6)

8

HL

C (2)

HU
(6)

8

L

C (1)

HU
(5)

6

HL

HL
(0)

HU
(6)

6

L

C (1)

U (3)

4

L

C (1)

U (3)

4
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Indicator Statements
S1
S2
S3
Totals
I-9
The case uses language in its
social media content to
communicate the belief the
L
C (1)
C (1)
2
United States is
unresponsive to the case’s
efforts to enact change.
I-11
The case uses language in its
social media content to
communicate the belief the
L
C (1)
C (1)
2
United States government
overreacts to the case
activities.
I-21
The case leaders, directors,
HL
HL
or elite operatives share
HL
0
(0)
(0)
social media content.
Source: Adapted from “Anticipating Social Movement National Security
Threats: Social Media Content’s Potential in Developing a Structured Analytical
Model,” by Brigit Davis, 2021, pp. 90-92, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses
Global.
Notes: The highlighted column is not scored and represents the home scenario.
HL = Highly Likely, L = Likely, C = Could, U = Unlikely, HU = Highly Unlikely.
Indicator I-3 is a possible resource available to a case but did not appear in any
social media content or the literature review. The researcher included it as an
indicator here because the possession of weapons shows a case has the capability
and intention to engage in violent contention, terrorist tactics, or war.

The paired comparison and weighted ranking methods both showed
distinct possibilities in assessing the probability of a threat. The difference
between the paired comparison and weighted ranking is that there are
additional refined criteria for some of the indicators in the second. For
example, the author distinguished between a problem that causes assault,
rape, and murder to one that is much more benign, resulting in a higher
degree of specificity for practitioners looking to discover the probability of
a social movement or SMO threat to the United States. In the rudimentary
models developed, both methods resulted, as expected, in the
Revolutionary 1 case with the highest percentage and the Reformative 2
case on the lower end, Table 3. The placement of these two cases and the
remaining three correspond with available background information and
related actions around the time of the social media postings.
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Table 3. Overall Percentages of Case Study Applied to Scenario 1
Indicators for Tested SAT Models
Paired Comparison
Weighted Ranking
Revolutionary Case 1
28.26%
27.68%
Reactionary Case 1
20.94%
16.24%
Reactionary Case 2
19.86%
14.4%
Reformative Case 1
11.14%
2%
Reformative Case 2
3.94%
0%
Source. Adapted from “Anticipating Social Movement National Security
Threats: Social Media Content’s Potential in Developing a Structured Analytical
Model,” by Brigit Davis, 2021, pp. 96-97, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses
Global.

Conclusion
Based on the research results, there is significant potential in using social
media content posted by social movements to inform the development of a
structured analytical model to anticipate potential threats. However,
because the research consisted of a limited number of literature sources,
cases, and social media platforms for data collection, future research may
necessitate additional research and refinement of the model. The
recommendations compiled in Table 4 focus on expanding literature
sources and subject matter expertise to refine themes, develop a coding
schema, and develop and refine a model. The recommendations also
include outside factors such as policy focused on defining what constitutes
public social media information and what pre-emptive actions the public
would consider allowable to reduce potential social movement threats.
Table 4. Recommendations for Future Research
Future Structured Analytical Model Research Recommendations
Recommendation 1
Delve further into social movement themes by using
focus groups with researchers and practitioners in
social movement, terrorism, and intelligence fields
to vet and expand the coding schema.
Recommendation 2
Collect content on new cases to link social
movement themes to collected social movement
content and expand places of data collection to
other social media platforms.
Recommendation 3
Delve into the possibilities of incorporating other
forms of public information to inform the proposed
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Future Structured Analytical Model Research Recommendations
model, such as websites, news articles, and focused
regional research.
Recommendation 4
Code new cases using a team of researchers and
strategic security practitioners to identify and
correct discrepancies to increase confidence in the
findings’ consistency and reliability.
Recommendation 5
Delve further into the development and validation
of indicators to assess potential social movement
threats using a diverse team of social movement,
terrorism, and intelligence
researchers/practitioners.
Recommendation 6
Explore further the rudimentary paired comparison
and weighted ranking models designed for the
study, or any others, which could use indicators
derived from coded social content to assess social
movement threats to U.S. national security.
Future Policy Research Recommendations
Recommendation 7
Explore what publicly available means when
applied to information shared on social media
content.
Recommendation 8
Explore what pre-emptive actions Federal and
State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial decision-makers
could use to prevent a social movement or SMO
from posing a national security threat to the United
States.
Recommendation 9
Delve into whether there is a difference in what the
U.S. populace considers acceptable options to
reduce the potential threat of domestic movements
and foreign movements.
Source: Adapted from “Anticipating Social Movement National Security
Threats: Social Media Content’s Potential in Developing a Structured Analytical
Model,” by Brigit Davis, 2021, pp. 104-107, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses
Global.
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